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RESUMEN
 El artículo pretende hacer un estudio comparativo de las novelas El 
loro de Flaubert (1984) e Inglaterra, Inglaterra (1998), dos novelas repre-
sentativas de la obra de Julian Barnes, y algunos cuentos cortos de Jorge 
Luis Borges. Sabiendo positivamente que Barnes estudió a Borges, este 
texto traza las correspondencias o similitudes que constituyen los ecos de 
Borges rastreables en Barnes. El estudio gira alrededor de la noción de au-
tenticidad, su problematización y otras obsesiones, literarias y filosóficas, 
comunes a ambos autores. Temas como la oposición entre el arquetipo y 
la copia, los problemas de identidad y la fiabilidad de la memoria serán los 
hilos conductores del ensayo. El método empleado será el análisis de la po-
tencial intertextualidad independientemente de los aspectos biográficos o 
contextuales.
Palabras clave: Barnes; Borges; hipertexto; relaciones platónicas; 
realidad; fiabilidad.
ABSTRACT
 The article attempts to make a comparative study of Flaubert’s Parrot 
(1984) and England, England (1998), two of Julian Barnes’ most celebrated 
novels, and Jorge Luis Borges’ selected short fiction. Knowing positively 
that Barnes read Borges, this text will trace the correspondences and (dis)
similarities that constitute the echoes of Borges that can be uncovered in 
Barnes. The main focus will be on the notion of authenticity, its problema-
tization and other subsidiary literary and philosophical obsessions com-
mon to both authors, namely the opposition between the archetype and 
the copy, identity problems and the reliability of memory. Language and 
its problems will be considered as the thread that binds all these topics 
together.  The method employed will be the analysis of potential intertex-
tuality regardless of biographical or contextual aspects.
Keywords: Barnes; Borges; hypertext; Platonic connections; reality; 
reliability.
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It is widely acknowledged that British author Julian Barnes read and ad-
mired Jorge Luis Borges. Several scholars have already noted this link and 
have studied some of its literary and biographical implications (Moneta, 
2013: 69). We do not attempt to establish whether these coincidences in 
topics are intentional or not, as we know that there are times when authors 
may influence other writers unconsciously or inadvertently. Umberto Eco 
writes in Interpretation and Overinterpretation (2002) about the influenc-
es that have been found in his writings, of which he was unaware: “I have 
read critical analyses in which the interpreter discovered influences of 
which I was unaware when writing, but I certainly had read those books in 
my youth and I understood that I was unconsciously influenced by them” 
(75). Having studied him, it is not strange that Barnes shares some of the 
Argentinian’s most recurrent topics, obsessions and literary artifices, such 
as identity problems, memory and its reliability in the attempt to grasp the 
past and also the fixation with platonic doctrines like the opposition be-
tween the archetype and the copy. All these concerns can be grouped un-
der the category of authenticity and its problems. It is indeed our belief that 
this issue is at the core of Barnes’ Flaubert’s Parrot (1984) and England, 
England (1998), and that it is present in a manifold way. 
 Barnes probes into the question of authenticity with Borges in mind. 
Several apocryphal quotes and texts serve as an intertextual tool to set 
the grounds for such a quest. A dialogue between Barnes and Borges is 
therefore established, trespassing the boundaries of the book and creat-
ing a network of ideas and literary topoi to be disentangled. It is the text 
itself that drives us into searching for hypertextual clues and hidden ref-
erences: “we are not making direct reference, although of course in our 
intertextual world such reference, however ironic, is of course implicit and 
inevitable. I hope we all understand that there is no such thing as a ref-
erence-free zone” (Barnes, England, England: 53). Thus, we attempt to 
trace these references behind Barnes’ novels, always taking the texts as a 
semiotic battlefield and leaving biographical and other contextual aspects 
in the background. That the intention of the author is not the core issue 
here has been already pointed out. As Eco suggests, the intention of the 
author is often “very difficult to find out and frequently irrelevant for the 
interpretation of a text” (25). Consequently, we do not mean to decipher 
what Barnes meant but what his texts actually offer, whether he intended 
it or not. 
 One of the most prominent problems that arise when reading Barnes 
is that of language, and whether it is an adequate tool to know the world. 
This has been already discussed extensively by L. Moneta (2013) but it is 
worth revising it. In the very first pages of Flaubert’s Parrot the narrator, 
Geoffrey Braithwaite, is concerned about the reliability of words: “Don’t 
we believe the words enough?” (Barnes, 1990: 12). And the answer would 
be no. By mocking the French academics, Barnes makes explicit the suspi-
cion that pervades his literature, namely, that language might not be that 
suitable an instrument to give an accurate account of the reality that sur-
rounds us. Borges shares this preoccupation to a large extent, as he shows 
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in texts such as the following monologue spoken by the Minotaur in “La 
casa de Asterión”: 
Como el filósofo, pienso que nada es comunicable por el arte de la escri-
tura. Las enojosas y triviales minucias no tienen cabida en mi espíritu, 
que está capacitado para lo grande; jamás he retenido la diferencia entre 
una letra y otra. Cierta impaciencia generosa no ha consentido que yo 
aprendiera a leer. A veces lo deploro, porque las noches y los días son 
largos (68).
 This paragraph is pervaded by the same concern that Geoffrey shows. 
We wonder to what extent we can be sure about the words of the Minotaur, 
if he claims that he does not know how to read. This introduces the idea 
that ultimately we, as readers, cannot be sure of the intention of a given 
narrator because language is too poor a tool. There have been philoso-
phers who, troubled by the insufficiency of language, have come up with 
theories such as the referential theory of language, posited by Locke. He 
proposed a language of particulars; a language where there would be no 
universals because they lead to ambiguity. If each entity in the world had a 
proper name to refer to it, language would not be subject to confusion and 
misinterpretation; we would believe the words to be enough. The most 
evident objection to this theory is that if applied, there would be as many 
words as entities in the world, thus making communication ultimately im-
possible. Not only has this been an objection stated from a philosophical 
point of view but also from a literary one, in 1726 Jonathan Swift parodied 
this idea in Gulliver’s Travels:
The other project was a scheme for entirely abolishing all words whatso-
ever; and this was urged as a great advantage in point of health as well 
as brevity. For it is plain that every word we speak is in some degree a 
diminution of our lungs by corrosion, and consequently contributes to 
the shortening of our lives. An expedient was therefore offered, that since 
words are only names for things, it would be more convenient for all men 
to carry about them such things as were necessary to express the par-
ticular business they are to discourse on. […] many of the most learned 
and wise adhere to the new scheme of expressing themselves by things, 
which hath only this inconvenience attending it, that if a man’s business 
be very great, and of various kinds, he must be obliged in proportion to 
carry a greater bundle of things upon his back, unless he can afford one 
or two strong servants to attend him. I have often beheld two of those 
sages almost sinking under the weight of their packs, like pedlars among 
us; who, when they met in the streets, would lay down their loads, open 
their sacks, and hold conversation for an hour together; then put up their 
implements, help each other to resume their burthens, and take their 
leave (203-204).
 Borges also takes narrative advantage of this premise in “Funes el 
memorioso” whose protagonist is gifted with enough memory and per-
ception to own such a language, rendering him incompetent to deal with 
a language of universals such as ours. Barnes’ narrators, together with 
Borges, definitely belong to the tradition that takes for granted “the un-
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derlying inadequacy of the Word” and considers language “tragically in-
sufficient” (Barnes, 1990: 19). Although tentative in her claim, Martha 
Cochrane, the protagonist of England, England, acknowledges that “[T]
he words don’t seem to fit the thoughts nowadays” (237), thus pointing to 
another philosophical problem about the nature of language and things 
that has concerned thinkers ever since antiquity. It is well known that 
Plato, one of Borges’ favourite sources, reproduced the discussion about 
the arbitrariness of words and their nature in dialogues such as Cratylus. 
This leads us to wonder whether words naturally represent the thing they 
are referring to or if they are merely conventional. And if conventional, 
we wonder whether words are anything more than lies, since they do not 
bear a relationship of necessity with the thing. Jack Pitman calls all of his 
personal assistants “Susie” regardless of their real names, and that is why 
“it was not really her name he was unsure of, but her identity” (Barnes, 
England, England: 34). The name given to these women does not corre-
spond to who they really are and therefore, the relationship between the 
name and the thing represented is, indeed, artificial. 
 Borges took part in this discussion and adopted different and contra-
dictory positions in his fiction. In this article, we are to resort to him as 
a counterpoint to Barnes’ theories, although one must be careful when 
using Borges as the representative of a single philosophical idea. Just as 
Barnes does, Borges used fiction as a tool to play with philosophical the-
ories, and practically every piece of fiction he wrote is the literary repre-
sentation of a concrete philosophical postulate. Thus, when we refer to his 
conclusions we must clarify that we know that these are not definitive, 
fixed philosophical beliefs but just mere pretexts to write literature. For 
the sake of the comparison between the two authors, we have selected 
those texts in which Borges denies the duplicity (and hence, the corre-
spondence) between the word and the thing itself. In order to explain this, 
we have to refer to two opposite conceptions of language as represented 
by Saint Augustine and the Kabbalah. The Augustinian tradition has pre-
vailed in the Western world, perpetuating the notion that the real world 
contains entities, concepts or things, which are perceived by the senses, 
whereas in the (symbolic) world of language there are different entities 
or words, which designate the things in the real world. Translated to Pla-
tonic terms, things would stand for Ideas and words for copies (as will be 
explained below). This implies that the world exists out of and before our 
language, and we just name it through symbolic processes. 
 Given this duplicity between words and things, Borges deliberately in-
troduces the Third Man Argument, which is the Aristotelian critique to the 
Platonic theory of ideas. Borges was no stranger to the argument, as can be 
confirmed in “Avatares de la tortuga”, where he attributes it to Aristotle1:
1 Although Aristotle names, explains and promotes the argument, he is not responsible for 
its enunciation, as claimed in Borges’ quote. The main plot is described by Plato in one of his 
later middle dialogues, Parmenides. Whether attributed to ignorance, a lapse of memory, or 
a diversion –three recurrent elements in Borges’ oeuvre– the authorship question does not 
compromise the article’s thread.
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Debemos a la pluma de Aristóteles la comunicación y la primera refuta-
ción de esos argumentos. Los refuta con una brevedad quizá desdeñosa, 
pero su recuerdo le inspira el famoso argumento del tercer hombre con-
tra la doctrina platónica (255).
 With such proposal, he takes the side of the Kabbalistic approach to 
language, which conveys the idea that the world is, ultimately, language. 
The Third Man Argument essentially maintains that when there is du-
plicity between word and thing, this duplicity is subject to corruption by 
means of degeneration, because once separated, that is, once two elements 
are proposed, the Third Man Argument is set in motion. This exposes the 
weakness of the platonic theory of ideas, rendering them useless or inex-
istent, by evincing the need of infinite elements between a given object in 
reality and its archetype. If there is a separation between the word and 
the thing, there is room for this dissociation to become corrupted. Con-
sequently, the word no longer represents the idea in an honest way. After 
such an infinite train of corruption, the difference between object and idea 
would be such that the two elements would be unrecognizable. 
 In order to eliminate the Third Man Argument Borges suggests that 
words and things are ultimately one thing: there is no duplicity, not a con-
tainer (word) and its content (thing) but just one entity. As usual, Borg-
es uses fiction to deal with philosophical concerns as though they were 
games. Thus, in “La rosa de Paracelso”, we see how the master Paracelso 
is asked by his apprentice to reconstruct a rose that had been previously 
destroyed. Paracelso claims that he would need only one word to do so:
–Te digo que la rosa es eterna y que solo su apariencia puede cambiar. Me 
bastaría una palabra para que la vieras de nuevo.
¿Una palabra? –dijo con extrañeza el discípulo–. El atanor está apagado 
y están llenos de polvos los alambiques. ¿Qué harías para que resurgiera?
Paracelso lo miró con tristeza. […] Paracelso se quedó solo. Antes de apa-
gar la lámpara y de sentarse en el fatigado sillón, volcó el tenue puñado de 
ceniza en la mano cóncava y dijo una palabra en voz baja.
La rosa resurgió (388-390).
 The word uttered by Paracelso would not be, precisely, a word but the 
real, ideal rose itself: there is no separation between the real rose and the 
word which represents it. This problem is similarly presented in Borges’ 
story “Parábola del palacio”, where we read that “En el mundo no puede 
haber dos cosas iguales; bastó (nos dicen) que el poeta pronunciara el 
poema para que desapareciera el palacio, como abolido y fulminado por 
la última sílaba” (180). The palace disappears when a poet writes it (not 
writes about it, but writes it), just as the rose appears when Paracelso says 
it. This same problem can also be found in Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Oval 
Portrait”, where a young lady dies in the very moment when her beloved 
finishes painting her portrait (1990, 305-307). Borges also deals with this 
very problem in his poem “El otro tigre” in which he speaks about a tiger 
that only exists in the language: it is a representation and not an actual 
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tiger. It is therefore not real, because the mere act of naming it distorts its 
entity and transforms it into fiction: 
El tigre vocativo de mi verso 
Es un tigre de símbolos y sombras, 
Una serie de tropos literarios 
Y de memorias de la enciclopedia 
Y no el tigre fatal, la aciaga joya […] 
Al tigre de los símbolos he opuesto 
El verdadero, el de caliente sangre, […] 
Alarga en la pradera una pausada 
Sombra, pero ya el hecho de nombrarlo 
Y de conjeturar su circunstancia 
Lo hace ficción del arte y no criatura 
[…] Un tercer tigre buscaremos. Éste 
Será como los otros una forma 
De mi sueño, un sistema de palabras 
Humanas y no el tigre vertebrado 
[…]Bien lo sé, pero algo 
Me impone esta aventura indefinida, 
Insensata y antigua, y persevero 
En buscar […] 
El otro tigre, el que no está en el verso.
                                                        (202-203)
 Elsewhere in the poem (“en su mundo no hay nombres ni pasado”) 
(Borges, 1996d: 202), Borges claims that in the tiger’s world there are no 
names (because things are things in themselves, there is no separation 
noun/thing) nor past (because it cannot be grasped with certitude as the 
past is no more than a fiction). But still he vows to keep looking for the real 
tiger, the one which is not in the language. Just like Barnes, who knows 
that his inquiry in Flaubert’s Parrot is fruitless but still writes a whole 
book about it, and who knows that language is essentially unreliable but 
still relies on it to state how unreliable it is. It is in this point that Barnes 
and Borges diverge: while Barnes wonders about the correspondence be-
tween the word and the thing and thus inscribes himself in the Augustin-
ian tradition of language, Borges denies the existence of two elements (as 
we have already pointed out, this is only true in some of his works), and 
hence, any correspondence whatsoever. Barnes does not only maintain 
that the copy of the thing (and the word that represents it) is possible but 
that it becomes reality itself, whereas for Borges this is an illusion.
 As has been already pointed out, the discussion about words and things 
can be easily transferred to the broader field of copies and archetypes, and 
it is not difficult to understand in the archetypal game a relationship with 
Borges, who dwelt extensively on this subject. Barnes extends the problem 
of language to the problem of reality. This subject comes, once again, from 
the Platonic theory in which the world is composed by Ideas, that is, per-
fect archetypes, which are eternal, pre-existing and immutable, and the 
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world of Things, which are imperfect copies of the archetypes. The issue 
is arguably present in Flaubert’s Parrot, where the protagonist begins a 
quest to know which one is the original parrot that inspired Flaubert’s 
writings and which ones are mere copies. 
 However, it is in England, England where Barnes addresses this in a 
more direct way. The structure of Borges’ story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Ter-
tius” bears a certain resemblance to “England, England”. This has been 
pointed out by Moneta in the article “Borges y sus precursores: la obra de 
Julian Barnes”, without elaborating further after enunciating such a con-
nexion. Tlön is a world of ideas, an archetypal haven where thought pre-
vails over matter. As Button Burlá states: “Tlön es algo así como el mundo 
al revés, donde sólo las ideas tienen existencia concreta; los objetos están 
subordinados al pensamiento (Burlá: 73). Likewise, Jack Pitman’s En-
gland, England2 has reunited the “archetypal” features of Englishness, i.e. 
what the perfect idea of England is (note the “Fifty Quintessences of Eng-
lishness” in Barnes, 2012: 83-85), and has made of it a brand new country. 
Every feature that is contained in the idea of England is now part of Jack 
Pitman’s creation. England, England thus becomes at the same time the 
archetype and the copy: it is the archetype because it is ideal, and it is a 
copy because it re-produces or re-presents the idea of England. This is an 
interesting turning point: the copy displaces the original and becomes, 
as Sir Jack Pitman says, “the thing itself” (Barnes, 2012: 59). The copy is 
no longer a worse, degraded version of a purer thing but rather “an en-
hancement and enrichment, an ironization and summation of that world” 
(Barnes, 2012: 55). The original England is now abandoned and given the 
name of Anglia (mocking the idealized notion of Britannia), a name that 
suggests the state of rusticity and pre-civilization that now dominates the 
former England. The archetype has become a degraded version of the ar-
chetype itself. Barnes is here ironically mocking the Platonic theory in 
which the archetypes are perfect, immutable and eternal. If they were so, 
we could not explain that Pitman and his company have actually made 
England more perfect. 
 In order to understand this, it becomes necessary to discuss two con-
fronted conceptions about the nature of words, specifically regarding the 
duality between particulars and universals. Certain rationalist philos-
ophers have claimed that there are universals in re, meaning that uni-
versals are contained in things. In contrast, the nominalist tradition has 
defended that there are universals ante re, this is, things do not contain 
universal abstractions, which only exist in language. Nominalists claim 
that universals are ultimately flatus vocis that do not represent reality. 
Following this distinction, the “Englishness” that Jack Pitman exports 
would be a universal ante re. If it were a universal in re it could be con-
tained in original England and it would not be possible to transfer it to 
another entity. The copy would be a worse version of the archetype. How-
2 For the sake of clarity, it must be noted that italicized “England, England” refers to Barnes’ novel, 
whereas “England, England” refers to Jack Pitman’s new country.
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ever, the reverse is true in Jack Pitman’s world, which becomes a better 
version of England. England thus becomes a flatus vocis. A postmodernist 
explanation of what is at stake in England, England could be provided by 
the notion of “aura” as explained by Walter Benjamin. He talked about 
the status of artistic production in his essay “The work of art in the age 
of mechanical reproduction” (2007), claiming that when a piece of art is 
reproduced it loses its aura, its contextual integration (223). It is deprived 
of its ritualistic meaning, and by decontextualizing it its real significance 
fades. According to Benjamin, authenticity cannot be reproduced. Thus, 
even if Pitman’s creation definitely lacks the aura that would make of it an 
original creation, Barnes suggests that it does not matter. With or without 
aura, England, England is successful:
Indeed it has been incontrovertibly proven by many of those I have ear-
lier cited – that nowadays we prefer the replica to the original. We prefer 
the reproduction of the work of art to the work of art itself, the perfect 
sound and solitude of the compact disc to the symphony concert in the 
company of a thousand victims of throat complaints, the book on tape to 
the book on the lap (Barnes, 2012: 53).
 Archetypes are not supposed to be perfectible, but Barnes shows that 
in fact, they are. The underlying point here is the suggestion that authen-
ticity is something ever-changing and subjective and hence, unattainable. 
It is easy to claim that copies are imperfect, that they imply degradation 
and that they do not give a reliable account of reality. The next step is to 
claim the same about archetypes. As Dr Max clearly puts it: “Bo–gus im-
plies, to my mind, an authenticity which is being betrayed. But is this, I 
ask myself, the case in the present instance? Is not the very notion of the 
authentic somehow, in its own way, bogus?” (Barnes, 2012: 131). If authen-
ticity is bogus, then copies can become authentic, as can be seen in the 
novel. The real England is abandoned and the idea of England becomes 
associated to the copy and not to the original. This is what happens to the 
hrönir (“secondary objects”) in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”:
Hecho curioso: los hrönir de segundo y de tercer grado -los hrönir deriva-
dos de otro hrön, los hrönir derivados del hrön de un hrön– exageran las 
aberraciones del inicial; los de quinto son casi uniformes; los de noveno 
se confunden con los de segundo; en los de undécimo hay una pureza de 
líneas que los originales no tienen. El proceso es periódico: el hrön de 
duodécimo grado ya empieza a decaer (440).
 The same happens with the new population of England, England. Peo-
ple are hired to play certain “English roles” such as Robin Hood or Samuel 
Johnson. At first they just play their parts, according to the idea that En-
gland, England is more of a theme park than a real country. This takes us 
directly to Baudrillard’s notion of simulacra, as it will be explained below. 
However, as time goes by and the country obtains its independence they 
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start to become more deeply involved with their parts and actually begin 
to act as the characters they are representing:
Certain members of Backdrop could no longer be addressed as Pitco em-
ployees, only as the characters they were paid to inhabit. Their case was 
initially misdiagnosed. They were thought to be showing signs of dis-
content, whereas the opposite was the case: they were showing signs of 
content. They were happy to be who they had become, and didn’t wish to 
be other (Barnes, 2012: 198).
 Thus, Robin Hood and his gang begin to steal in order to benefit the 
poor and smugglers begin to smuggle, to the outrage of Jack Pitman and 
his team. Each performance copies the one from the day before, but ac-
cording to the Third Man Argument, each one is a degraded version of the 
former, leading to the point in which the original and the last one do not 
recognize each other. This leads to two possibilities: either a disintegra-
tion of the original, or, like in the case of the hrönir of 11th grade, the copy 
becomes an independent identity (they have “una pureza de líneas que los 
originales no tienen (Borges, 1996h: 440). We saw how Barnes wondered 
about the correspondence between the word and the thing, and even if 
he did not explicitly deny it, he was suspicious of it. Now, in the field of 
copies and archetypes, he seems to embrace the Aristotelian solution of 
the Third Man Argument by evincing that archetypes do not necessarily 
exist; in case they did, they are so far removed from the copies that are 
supposed to represent them that they do not affect our comprehension of 
the world. The copy in England, England turns out to be real and wins 
the ontological battle. Jean Baudrillard used the term “hyperreality” to 
describe the fact that the representation and its referent do no longer hold 
a relationship. The representation becomes the simulacra, which is now 
independent from the original. The process that Baudrillard describes can 
easily be applied to the process that Jack Pitman sets in motion:
–[the image] is the reflection of a basic reality 
–it masks and perverts a basic reality 
–it masks the absence of a basic reality 
–it bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simula-
crum (Baudrillard: 256).
 Thus, England, England reflects the basic reality of “Englishness” and 
perverts it by dispossessing it of its aura. Then it goes on to present itself 
as the “real” England, leaving Anglia in a state of rusticity, and ultimately 
England, England becomes a hyperreal. Baudrillard uses Disneyland as an 
effective materialization of this theory, defining it as “an imaginary effect 
concealing that reality no more exists outside than inside the bounds of 
the artificial perimeter” (Baudrillard: 262). We could very well substitute 
England, England for Disneyland and the analysis would remain the same.
 Once that England, England has supplanted England in the minds of 
its inhabitants we need to wonder about the role of memory and history in 
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the change from one country to the other. The utter oblivion of the origi-
nal England by the inhabitants of England, England is possible due to the 
futility of History, which is not a useful tool when trying to know the past. 
History is presented in the novel as the testimony of the powerful and thus 
as a biased, subjective construction of the past: “There was no history ex-
cept Pitco history” (Barnes, 2012: 202). The creation of England, England 
is the living proof of it. The inhabitants of England have adopted a brand 
new identity because as Martha thinks: “Old England had lost its histo-
ry, and therefore –since memory is identity– had lost all sense of itself.” 
(Barnes, 2012: 251). Another interesting example of this idea is found at 
the beginning of the novel, when Martha Cochrane and her Spanish friend 
discuss the figure of Sir Francis Drake, who is a national hero for the for-
mer and a pirate for the latter:
 
‘Francis Drake was a pirate’, she had said No he wasn’t, because she knew 
he was an English hero and a Sir and an Admiral and therefore a Gen-
tleman. When Cristina, more seriously this time, repeated, ‘He was a pi-
rate’, Martha knew that this was the comforting if necessary fiction of 
the defeated. Later, she looked up Drake in a British encyclopaedia, and 
while the word ‘pirate’ never appeared, the words ‘privateer’ and ‘plun-
der’ frequently did, and she could quite see that one person’s plundering 
privateer might be another person’s pirate, but even so Sir Francis Drake 
remained for her an English hero, untainted by this knowledge (Barnes, 
2012: 7).
 The pointlessness of the study of history is likewise made clear on 
several occasions in Flaubert’s Parrot. The second chapter of the novel 
is called “Chronology”, and it consists of three different chronologies of 
Flaubert’s life. The first one could be considered to be the most apparently 
objective one (that is, if neutrality exists, which probably it does not), one 
we could find in a school textbook. It gives a rather optimistic account 
of the writer’s life as it focuses on his literary achievements. The second 
chronology is basically a list of all the tragedies that ensued in his life, 
thus giving the impression that Flaubert’s life was over-all miserable and 
full of toil. The third and last is a recollection of fragments belonging to 
Flaubert’s private diary. None of the three chronologies lie – inasmuch 
as the three provide events that really did happen. However, as Moneta 
has already noticed (2013) the impression each of them makes is radi-
cally different, if not opposite, from the others. What we gather from this 
is something that Borges already felt in his short piece of non-fiction “El 
pudor de la historia”: “yo he sospechado que la historia, la verdadera his-
toria, es más pudorosa y que sus fechas esenciales pueden ser, asimismo, 
durante largo tiempo, secretas” (132). He claims that historical events are 
fabricated for advertising interests, and that history holds its own secrets 
to be unfolded. Also, he acknowledges that history can be created, almost 
out of nowhere, according to the interests of a particular individual.
 As suggested above, if using history to reach the truth about the 
past is to no avail, memory is not a better tool either: “‘What’s your first 
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memory?’ someone would ask. And she would reply, ‘I don’t remember’” 
(Barnes, 2012: 3). Thus begins England, England. Martha Cochrane, the 
protagonist, cannot remember what her first memory ever was because a 
first memory, she thinks,
Wasn’t something like your first bra, or your first friend, or your first kiss, 
or your first fuck, or your first marriage, or your first child, or the death 
of your first parent, or your first sudden sense of the lancing hopelessness 
of the human condition – it wasn’t like any of that. It isn’t a solid, seizable 
thing, which time, in its plodding, humorous way, might decorate down 
the years with fanciful detail (Barnes, 2012: 3).
 Barnes and Borges dwell on the idea of an unremembered memory as 
the origin of actual memory; although it might seem slightly contradictory, 
it appears to appeal to everyone’s initial cognitive impressions. The previous 
fragment resembles the beginning of Borges’ “La Noche de los dones”, where 
a character claims, as Martha does, that first memories are not reliable:
No acabo de entender lo de los arquetipos platónicos. Nadie recuerda la 
primera vez que vio el amarillo o el negro o la primera vez que le tomó 
el gusto a una fruta, acaso porque era muy chico y no podía saber que 
inauguraba una serie muy larga. Por supuesto, hay otras primeras veces 
que nadie olvida. (41)
 In relation to this problem, there is an anecdote documented by Button 
Burlá in which Borges talks about the uselessness of memory, using coins 
as a metaphor. He remembers how his father used to tell him that memo-
ries are like a pile of coins, where the first coin would be the most accurate 
memory and all the others a subsequent deformation of it. As Martha Co-
chrane would say, “A memory now of a memory a bit earlier of a memory 
before that of a memory way back when” (Barnes, 2012: 3):
‘Verás, esta primera moneda, la de abajo, sería la primera imagen, por 
ejemplo, de la casa de mi niñez. Esta segunda, sería el recuerdo de aquella 
casa cuando llegué a Buenos Aires. La tercera, otro recuerdo, y así una y 
otra vez. Y como en cada recuerdo hay una ligera diferencia, supongo que 
mis recuerdos de hoy no se asemejan mucho a los primeros recuerdos que 
tenía’ […] Y aquello me puso triste. Pensar que tal vez no tengamos recu-
erdos verdaderos de nuestra juventud (Borges quoted by Burlá, 1983: 74).
 This is similar to the succession of hrönirs in Tlön: hrönirs become 
more corrupted each time, but nevertheless they end up establishing a 
new reality, almost more perfect, more real than the previous one. The 
parallel between coins and memories is clear: they become more cor-
rupted each time but at the same time they bring about our perception 
of reality and the conceptualization of the past, which we take to be the 
real one. The same issue is troubling Geoffrey Braithwaite in Flaubert’s 
Parrot: “How do you compare two parrots, one already idealised by mem-
ory and metaphor, the other a squawking intruder?” (1990: 21). Barnes 
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and Borges not only agree that memory is not a reliable account of past 
events but insist that it is a rather deformed and manipulated conceptu-
alization of reality. History and memory are ultimately entangled: “Most 
people remembered history in the same conceited yet evanescent fashion 
as they recalled their own childhood” (Barnes, 2012: 82). To continue with 
the problem of memory we must mention Dr. Max the historian, another 
character from England, England, who while discussing history posits the 
idea –quite similar to Borges’– that it is futile to try to grasp the starting 
point of a memory:
We may choose to freeze a moment and say that it all “began” then, but as 
an historian I have to tell you that such labelling is intellectually indefen-
sible. What we are looking at is almost always a replica, if that is the local-
ly fashionable term, of something earlier. There is no prime moment (132).
 If the past is made up of memories and memories are ultimately lies 
and therefore unreliable, Barnes wonders “How do we seize the past? Can 
we ever do so?” (Flaubert’s Parrot: 14). There are two major underlying 
problems here and we shall now deal with them. In the first place, they 
are epistemological and ultimately ontological. These problems are the re-
current questions of how we can know, of the limits of said knowledge or, 
even, if the object of our knowledge is knowable. On Martha Cochrane’s 
opinion, memories are lies: “in all her years she was never to come across a 
first memory which was not in her opinion a lie” (Barnes, 2012: 4). Barnes 
thus reveals that the past is known through our subjective filters which 
deform and manipulate it, consequently creating a new reality that might 
be similar but never identical to that object we are trying to know. If mem-
ories are lies, then biographies are no more than a compilation of those 
lies: “the past is merely autobiographical fiction pretending to be a parlia-
mentary report” (Barnes, Flaubert’s Parrot: 90). 
 Along with the problem of memory and history, the figure of the author 
in the novels discussed becomes the epitome of the impossibility to grasp 
the past or even get a hold of the subtlest particle of truth. The question 
of identity remains unanswered, whether it refers to the narrator or the 
fictional figure of the author.  In Flaubert’s Parrot, Geoffrey Braithwaite 
is trying to re-construct Flaubert, as Borges would put it, ex ungue leo-
nem. Indeed, what Flaubert’s Parrot is really about is the quest that the 
narrator undergoes in order to find out about the French author and his 
life. As it often happens in postmodern novels, this quest is ironic in the 
sense that Barnes knows that his narrator’s enterprise is doomed from 
the very beginning: as we have been repeating throughout the essay, it is 
not possible to reach the truth about the past, be it through memory or 
through history. Braithwaite is aware of how unnecessary his task is, and 
as a postmodern narrator he has already sent the author to the guillotine, 
but still he feels the need to continue with his task:
Why does the writing make us chase the writer? Why can’t we leave well 
alone? Why aren’t the books enough? Flaubert wanted them to be: few 
writers believed more in the objectivity of the written text and the in-
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significance of the writer’s personality; yet still we disobediently pursue 
(Barnes, Flaubert’s Parrot: 12).
 The necessity to find out about The Author becomes an unsatisfied 
need for Braithwaite who realizes to his own demise that the task is im-
possible. The series of rhetorical questions seems, yet again, a paraphrase 
of Borges in “La flor de Coleridge” when he discusses:
La Historia de la literatura no debería ser la historia de los autores y de 
los accidentes de su carrera o de la carrera de sus obras sino la Historia 
del Espíritu como productor o consumidor de literatura. Esa historia po-
dría llevarse a término sin mencionar un solo escritor (17).
 Braithwaite is permanently torn between two drives: his urge to find 
out about the God-author, and his knowing that doing so is sterile. “God 
is dead, they told us, and therefore so is the God-like novelist” (Barnes, 
1990: 88). The farcical reference to the Barthesian death of the author is 
evident here. Barthes asserted the end of the Author-God and the theolog-
ical writing, but a century before Flaubert had already been “denying the 
significance of his own personality” (Barnes, Flaubert’s Parrot: 88). This 
“demand for authorial absence” (Barnes, Flaubert’s Parrot: 87) is present 
in Borges’ “A quien leyere”, where he acknowledges that the fact that he 
is the author of his texts is random and contingent, thus eliminating his 
God-like position: 
Si las páginas de este libro consienten algún verso feliz, perdóneme el lec-
tor la descortesía de haberlo usurpado yo, previamente. Nuestras nadas 
poco difieren; es trivial y fortuita la circunstancia de que seas tú el lector 
de estos ejercicios, y yo su redactor (16).
 It is clear that the feeling that reality and truth are problematic per-
vades both Barnes’ and Borges’ fiction. The correspondences and (dis)sim-
ilarities that manifest the influence Borges had upon Barnes have become 
evident, even if the conclusions that they reach are not the same in every 
case. Neither language, nor history nor memory, which are the traditional 
ways in which humans have tried to approach reality, provide a truthful 
account of the world. The general topic of authenticity and other subsidiary 
literary and philosophical obsessions, namely the opposition between the 
archetype and the copy, identity problems and the reliability of memory 
have worried both authors to the extent of defining their literary endeav-
ors. Language and its problems have been considered as thematic threads 
that unite all these topics together. However, at an ontological level we have 
seen how language becomes the reason for the disintegration of certainties. 
Just as the relation between language and reality becomes inadequate, the 
correspondence between archetypes and copies is deprived of meaning. 
The concept of an original entity is brutally displaced by the copies, which 
take over its originality. Authenticity, the archetype, the original, just as 
Flaubert’s parrot, are nowhere to be found: “What happened to the truth is 
not recorded” (Barnes, Flaubert’s Parrot: 65). 
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